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INTRODUCTION
My subject tonight is "International Law and Practice: Dealing
with the Past in the South African Experience."' This way of putting
Editor'sNote: The following is a revised version of a lecture presented at
the American Society of International Law's ("ASIL") 94th Annual Meeting on
April 5, 2000. The Grotius Lecture Series is co-sponsored by the American University Washington College of Law, the ASIL, and the International Legal Studies
Program. The purpose of the Grotius Lecture Series is to open the ASIL forum to
distinguished scholars for discussion about new and important voices that might
not be heard in international law and to create expanded space and opportunities to
explore the intellectual underpinnings of international law and the issues of our
time.
** Minister of Education, Republic of South Africa. I am grateful for the assistance of Ronald Suresh Roberts and Nicole Fritz in preparation of this lecture.
1. Those who seek a traditional, footnote-heavy approach to the issues that I
*
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it might make you think that international law is something apart and
distinct from practice. This way of speaking follows from the natural
rhythms of the legal mind. Lawyers have a long tradition of dichotomy. We constantly talk of theory versus practice, law versus morality, jurisprudence versus legislation. We insist that the black letter
law in the books must be carved away from debates about what the
law ought to be, and how it ought to operate in social and political
reality.
Now, of course, law has come a long way in the last hundred
years. The wisdom of legal realism and critical legal studies has
made lawyers increasingly self-conscious, even a little embarrassed,
about these inherited dichotomies. And nowhere should this be more
so than in the arena of international law. Practice in and of itself is a
fundamental constituent of what counts as customary international
law. In the vocabulary of the international law illuminati-in the
language that James Joyce would say carries the "true scholastic
stink"-practice is the "usus," which requires only that it be met by
"opinio juris," for a norm to enter the international law canon. But
we should need no fancy Latin tags to tell us that international law
must actually work in the real world, or else be laughed at. Law, as I
like to say, is a form of congealed politics. Law always does political
work anyway; lawyers must ensure that it is work well done. This,
then, is the aspiration.
Yet, law's moral and political realities seldom in fact match its
practical impacts-and this is as much the case in international law
as in law more generally. Here is one locus of disillusion, one space
of the ferment, which is your over-arching theme in this lecture series. The prominence of ferment in international law now is perhaps
ironic at the end of a decade in which the world's aspirations for international law have been so much larger than at any other time, bar
the ending of the Second World War. I know that it is the current
fashion, in academia particularly, to celebrate perpetual ferment-to
abhor certainties (which are usually called "false" certainties), and to
revel in nuance and uncertainty. But does this help save lives?
So I repeat: the collapse of a bipolar world order made us hope for
address more broadly are invited to consult my Chorley Lecture. See Kader Asmal,
Truth, Reconciliationand Justice: The South African Experience in Perspective, 63
MOD. L. REV. 1 (2000).
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an international community undivided; for debates less tendentious;
for a more cohesive approach to international conflicts; for a more
coherent international practice guided by a more definitive international law, more definitive because now all nations might agree in
good faith, rather than continuing to snarl at each other behind tiresome Cold War barricades.
Has this happened in fact? The establishment of the two ad hoc
international criminal tribunals this decade and the talk of an International Criminal Court ("ICC") now can be seen as a reflection of a
growing consensus. But these tribunals have attracted a certain controversy. They have been unable to apprehend many of those indicted because of an absence of political will. So too the ICC, which,
without a U.S. signature and ratification, is never likely to command
the political backing required to act effectively. And the United Nations ("UN") itself, ostensible overseer of international law, has had
to acknowledge in two recently commissioned reports that its failures
contributed to two of the most egregious events of the 1990s-the
genocide in Rwanda and the massacre in Srebrenica. The chasm
between practice and principle seems cause for a check on our faith
in international law.2
In my speech this afternoon I want to focus on international intervention-PRACTICE-in the domestic jurisdiction of nation states.
The international intervention in South Africa against apartheid took
many forms. There were economic, cultural and military sanctions
-although there was direct international military intervention. Yet
in many of our debates about international human rights intervention,
many analysts make a beeline for military intervention, as though it
were the only relevant option for an international response. Military
intervention commands too much of the spotlight. It is therefore
gratifying to see in the evolving human rights approaches to transitional justice that a range of options is receiving serious analysis.
These alternatives include fact-finding and denunciation, use of the
media, sanctions, dialogue and related remedies, developing codes of
practice and offering technical assistance.'
2. See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Hunman Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999) (presenting a thoughtful review of enforcement
issues).
3. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ENDS AND MEANS:
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So while I will spend some time addressing military intervention, I
do so only to highlight another, perhaps equally powerful form of
action-judicial intervention. The imposition of prosecution and
punishment by a national or supra-national judicial authority, although very welcome in many instances, can also pose a host of difficulties for those societies that have undergone political transition
and in so doing have enacted amnesty arrangements which foreclose
the possibility of prosecution. South Africa is one such society.
In brief, the South African democracy born in 1994 succeeded
nearly a half-century of racial discrimination, raised to the level of
being a constitutional principle. It was a period of brutal oppression,
hit squads, violent attacks on neighboring states, and even research
into chemical warfare and eugenics. The new and democratic Parliament chose to confront this terrible past through the establishment
of a truth and reconciliation commission ("TRC"), a body established
by an Act passed in mid-1995. 4 The objective of this Act was to
deepen our country's factual and interpretative grasp of its terrible
past, going back to 1960.5 The Commission was mandated to pronounce on what had been done by whom, to whom, why, and what
was to be done about these past abuses in our calmer present times.
Unlike many truth commissions that preceded it,6 our own was not
solely concerned with granting amnesty to perpetrators of human
rights abuses. It, in addition, gave a voice to the victims' and provided for reparation to and rehabilitation of victims.! Furthermore,
while it indeed conferred amnesty in respect of criminal and civil liability for human rights abuses, it was subject to various important
criteria, notably requirements that there be full disclosure of the facts
(forthcoming fall 2000).
4. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 (1995) (S.
Afir.) [hereinafter Reconciliation Act] (providing for the establishment of a truthseeking commission to investigate violations of human rights law).
HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES To ARMED GROUPS

5. See id. § 3 (stating the objectives of the Commission).
6. Cf Priscilla B. Hayner, International Guidelines for the Creation and Operation of Truth Commissions: A Preliminary Proposal, 59 LAW & CONTEi'P.
PROBS. 173 (1996) (discussing the minimal requirements for truth-seeking commissions and examining the growing number of such commissions).
7. See Reconciliation Act, supra note 5, § 11 (detailing the guiding principles
for dealing with victims).
8. See id. ch. 5 (governing the reparation and rehabilitation of victims).
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surrounding the abuse; 9 that the abuse be associated with a political
objective (as opposed, for instance, to motivation for personal gain);
and that the abuse was proportionate to the political goal that it
sought to advance."
We South Africans are proud owners of a brand new democracy.
We have our house in order, our economy as well. But as a houseproud nation, we must guard against developing our own African
variant of manifest destiny: the belief that our solutions must automatically be Africa's solutions too. More broadly, it is tempting to
believe that our human rights experience should be the starting point
of all discussions, whether in relation to Africa or beyond. Too many
speeches by South Africans begin with the TRC process and use it in
order to extrapolate for other circumstances. I want this evening to
try to do the reverse-looking globally to situate the South Africa
experience within this global context.

I. KOSOVO AND PINOCHET: SAME DAY,
WORLDS AWAY
On 24 March 1999, two events signified a new international resolve towards intervention. In London, the Appeals Chamber of the
House of Lords, after a second hearing on the matter, announced its
decision that, in principle, Chilean ex-president Augusto Pinochet
could be extradited to Spain." The request for his extradition had
been handed to British authorities by Spanish prosecutor Baltazar
Garzon, in order that he might be tried in Spain for crimes against
humanity allegedly committed during his rule. Although some of the
alleged crimes had been committed against Spanish nationals, thus
allowing Garzon to rely on the jurisdictional principle of protection,
many of the crimes for which his extradition was requested had no
direct link to Spain, and the Spanish prosecutor therefore relied on
the principle of universal jurisdiction. It was the first time that a for-

9. See id. § 20(1)(c) (providing for amnesty in the event that the Commission
determines that an applicant has made full disclosure of all relevant facts).
10. See id. § 20 (outlining the rules for reviewing amnesty applications).
11. See Adam Roberts, NATO's "Hunianitarian War" Over Kosovo, 41
SURVIVAL 3, 102 (1999) (noting that this decision was a landmark in the evolution

of human rights law).
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mer head of state was subjected to extradition proceedings in a
country of which he was not a national in response to a request for
extradition from a country of which he was not a national and where
his own State had granted him amnesty from prosecution during its
transition. This particular event has been characterized as judicial
intervention in another State's internal affairs and an attack on sovereign immunity. It is seen as an attack on a principle said to be central
to international law - the principle of national sovereignty.
On the same day, 24 March 1999, NATO launched its Operation
Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The justification given was that "there are some [international] crimes so extreme that the state responsible for them ...may properly be the

subject of military intervention.' ' In Kosovo, Milosevic was accused
of having systematically withdrawn, since 1989, the limited rights of
self-governance granted the Kosovars in the 1974 national constitution, and having escalated the oppression in recent years through
killings, torture, and mass evictions.
The Kosovo Campaign was the first time that a sustained use of
force had been directed at a state for allegedly perpetrating atrocities
within its own borders. Much of this development could be foreseen
in the evolution of anti-apartheid doctrine in international law over
the years, as my co-authors and I argue in greater detail in our book
on South Africa and transitional justice.'" Much of the battle for mobilization of international opinion and action against apartheid was a
battle against the view that the apartheid state, like states in general,
had a sovereign right to determine its own internal affairs, without
harassment by nosy human rights outsiders.4
As to Kosovo, no one refuted the claim that there had been a violation of national sovereignty as traditionally configured. Instead,
those who supported the action argued that the principle of national
sovereignty is trumped by the importance of the human rights
agenda, by our abhorrence of gross human rights abuses. When per12. See id. at 103.
13. See KADER ASMAL ET AL., RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTI: A
RECKONING OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE 176 (2d ed. 1997) (examining

apartheid in the international community).
14. See id. at 177-78 (emphasizing the shift in focus to the rights of the individual and away from the rights of the State).

2000]

GROTIUs LECTURE SERIES

1217

secuted individuals and national groups have exhausted all remedies
and stand defenseless before the aggression of their home state, they
have the right to demand and receive international humanitarian and
even military assistance. These internationalist (as opposed to Westphalian) advocates were quick to explain, however, that military intervention should always be an instrument of last resort. They urged
that it should only be deployed where human rights abuses reach the
level of a systematic attempt to expel or exterminate in large numbers individuals who are unable to defend themselves; where the
abuses constitute an international threat to peace; where all diplomatic attempts have been exhausted and, finally, where military effort stands a real chance of stopping the abuses and restoring peace.
It is interesting that both the actions of 24 March 1999, representing initiatives that impact fundamentally on international law, occurred outside the ambit of the United Nations. Although future
heads of State accused of Pinochet-style crimes will be liable to be
prosecuted before the United Nations' International Criminal Court,
provided their crimes are committed after the entry into force of the
Rome Statute, 6 Pinochet will be immune from the ICC's jurisdiction,
as the Statute has no retrospective effect." On the other hand, military intervention in Kosovo might have occurred under the aegis of
the United Nations' Security Council had there been a determination
of an act of aggression, a breach of the peace or a threat to the peace
under the Chapter 7 powers of the UN Charter. Both actions are tes-

15. See Robert Skidelsky & Michael Ignatieff, Is Militar" Intervention Over
Kosovo Justified? PROSPECT (June 1999) <http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk,
highlights/military-kosovo/index.html>.
16. Prosecution of future heads of State before the ICC will also depend on a
host of other factors - e.g., where the leader's own country has not prosecuted or
has decided not to prosecute. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. GAOR, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Annex 2, art. 17(0)(b), U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Rome Statute] (providing that the
Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where "'the case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to
prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute").
17. However, the ICC could adopt the reasoning of a recent Chilean High
Court, holding that "disappearances" for which no information exists constitute
continuing crimes.
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timony to the present-day reality of the international rule of law as
the rule of plenty, operating through many different legal orders,
composed at a variety of levels-national, regional and international-often making for apparently fragmentary and arbitrary
choices.
The same-day launch of the Kosovo Campaign and the delivery of
the Pinochet judgment threw into sharp relief the paradox of having a
State prosecute a violator regime when the same State could not have
acted against the atrocities at the time they were being committed.
Neither Spain nor any other country was entitled to military intervention in Chile in order to remove the authoritarian regime. Nor was
it imaginable that Spain, or any other country, would have indicted
Pinochet while he was President of Chile. The juxtaposition of
Kosovo and Pinochet makes ironic judgment premised on the principle that a wrong had been done to all of humanity when, at the time
that the wrongs were committed, the right to resist was not generally
construed as universal. It suggests that punishment of the perpetrator
is more important than protection of the victim.'

II. MILITARY INTERVENTION ON ITS OWN
TERMS AND IN CONTEXT
So must we then applaud the Kosovo intervention for removing
this contradiction? Not too quickly. NATO's operations have forced
us to question the validity of military intervention. In particular, we
must ask whether and when a military campaign itself can be called
humanitarian, which is a question to be addressed, not begged. We
must, therefore, be extremely cautious about the suggestion made by
Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, that "the United Nations
should adopt new rules allowing the international community to intervene in sovereign states to halt 'an overwhelming humanitarian
catastrophe."" 9 There is a real risk that the United Nations might, in
this picture, become an errand boy for NATO. The democratization
of the international arena is essential for the credibility of intema-

18. See P. Kahn, The End of the Post-War Compromise? 8 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
19. Andrew Parker, Cook Callsfor UN Rules to Allow State Intervention, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2000, at 3.
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tional law and institutions in general, let alone for the legitimacy of
specific acts of military intervention. As one critic of Aryeh Neier
has forcefully complained, too often "[tihere is no attempt to link
international authority to the political consent of the global population, to find true democratic legitimization."2"
An ancillary question, which, although not undermining the project of military force for humanitarian purposes, nevertheless discredits those who would wield such force, is whether double standards are applied. The first question relates to an assessment of the
NATO campaign on its own terms; the latter requires that the
Kosovo crisis be placed in context. Severe criticism has been directed at the NATO military intervention. NATO's high altitude,
casualty-free strategy precluded precision bombing and foreseeably
increased the scale of civilian casualties on the ground. That there
were many Serbs who were neither Milosevic nor his militia got lost
in this show of force. 2' From analysts such as Noam Chomsky, there
were even more hard-hitting attacks on the NATO campaign-that
the war had been attempted to boost NATO's credibility as an
arch-demonstration of power against the one state which had most
frustrated its efforts to ensure substantial control of Europe and that
the war in Kosovo had been staged as a very visible warning to other
states which might be similarly disinclined to conform.2- It is undeniably odd to see NATO, a politically accountable, partisan, and also
military organization, occupying the fundamentally separate roles of
complainant, judge, jury, and executioner in Kosovo.
But even if all the discrediting voices could be discounted-if the
war had been completely successful in stopping abuses and restoring
peace, if we could readily accept the motivations of the intervention
as benevolent, even if Milosevic and his military forces had been the

20. See John R. Bolton, The Global Prosecutors:Hunting War Criminals in tie
Name of Utopia, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 157, 158 (arguing that without a
constitution, international law has no mechanism for dispute resolution, compliance, or enforcement short of warfare).
21. See NOAM CHOMsKY, THE NEW MILITARY HUMANISM: LESSONS FROM
Kosovo 92-93 (1999) (describing the outburst against the Serbs as "virulent racehatred and jingoism, a phenomenon I have not seen in my lifetime since the hysteria whipped up about 'the Japs' during World War II").
22. See id. at 81-103 (detailing justifications for NATO's intervention).
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sole targets-we would still need to confront another question: why
have conflicts in Africa or Asia never merited this type of humanitarian assistance? Why did nobody smart-bomb P.W. Botha? Bombing aside, why have international humanitarian interventions in my
continent always been half-hearted and faltering?
Six years ago, as the U.S. sustained casualties in Somalia in a professed humanitarian mission, American journalist Robert Kaplan
wrote an influential essay describing "an increasing lawlessness [in
Africa] that is far more significant than any coup, rebel incursion, or
episodic experiment in democracy."23 An Africa, he said, where
"criminal anarchy emerges as the real 'strategic' danger,"2 4 characterized by "the withering away of central governments, the rise of
tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the
growing pervasiveness of war."25 The article captured all the ennui
felt by European and American policy-makers towards conflict in
Africa and which most tragically reverberated in the minds of those
responsible for official UN positions. Less than a year after the
bombing of Mogadishu by UN troops, approximately 800,000 people
were slaughtered in Rwanda over the course of about 100 days. A
report commissioned by the Secretary-General on the genocide in
Rwanda blamed the United Nations system as a whole for failing to
prevent and subsequently stop the slaughter. 6 Institutional deficiencies, a lack of resources and an absence of political commitment all
contributed to the reprehensible passivity.
In 1998, during President Clinton's tour of Africa, he publicly
apologized for the past failures by the West to intervene. And yet in
early 1999, as NATO readied itself for intervention in Kosovo, Sierra
Leone was a virtually forsaken place. As atrocities were carried out,
Nigeria, under the aegis of an ECOMOG peacekeeping mandate,

23. Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTA MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at

44, 45.
24. See id. at 46.
25. See id. at 48.
26. See Letter Dated 15 December 1999 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President Of The Security Council, U.N. SCOR, at 3-59, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/1257 (1999) (containing the Report of the Independent Inquir , Into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, which discusses
the inadequacy of the United Nations' response to the Rwandan genocide).
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sent in its troops. However, weaponry, funding, communications and
intelligence promised by the United States and Britain did not materialize. Instead, the Sierra Leone President was pressured to open
peace talks with the Revolutionary United Front just weeks after they
had massacred thousands in the capital Freetown. Amnesties along
the lines of27those granted to Renamo militants in Mozambique were
negotiated.

III. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION FOR THE THIRD
WORLD
So, for much of the world, effective intervention at the time at
which the atrocities are committed still seems a far-off eventuality.
Judicial intervention does not seem a similarly distant mirage. While
the Western world chose to turn its face from the genocide in
Rwanda, it saw in Rwanda's request for an International Criminal
Tribunal, similar to that which had been convened for the former
Yugoslavia, an opportunity to regain some credibility. So insistent
was it on meeting this request that it failed to be deterred when
Rwanda finally rejected the idea and voted against its establishment
in the Security Council. When Haile Mariam Mengistu entered South
Africa for medical treatment, many demanded that South Africa
prosecute or extradite him to a country willing to prosecute. Most recently, Hissein Habre, styled Africa's own Pinochet, has been indicted by a court of the country in which he sought asylum: Senegal.
Prosecutions and punishment of systematic human rights abuses
seem to have little deterrent effect. The International Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, convened at the time of war within Bosnia,
seems to have had little impact on the scale of atrocities committed
within Kosovo, despite the fact that these crimes fell within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. That judicial action alone can have little deterrent effect was recognized as far back as Nuremberg, when U.S.
Chief Prosecutor, Justice Robert Jackson, observed in his opening
address:
Judicial action always comes after the event. Wars are started only on the

27. See Steve Coll, The Othier War, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2000 (Magazine), at
W08 (comparing the treatment of human rights violations in Sierra Leone with
those of Kosovo).
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theory and in the confidence that they can be won. Personal punishment,
to be suffered only in the event the war is lost, will probably not be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where the warmakers feel the chances of
defeat to be negligible."

Yet prosecution and punishment serve another purpose-justice.
They allow the victims some sense of redress, of equanimity. My
suggestion is not therefore that where prevention is disabled, prosecution and punishment should be foregone. On the contrary, it becomes essential that the reverse happen. And where the state, site of
the violations, is itself unable to prosecute, then prosecution and
punishment on the basis of universal jurisdiction becomes the task of
the international community.
Yet, we must also go a step further. Where, as in Chile and in
South Africa, a state declines to prosecute past despots as a result of
a democratic, conscious, public decision widely seen as fundamental
to the implementation of democracy, I doubt that other states are, or
ought to be, free to take up the task. So how are we to distinguish
between those cases in which the international community may validly prosecute and punish on the basis of universality and those instances in which other states and international bodies should defer to
the particular state's wishes to forego prosecution and punishment?
Part of the answer, I think, lies in formulating requirements similar
to those demanded of military intervention by internationalists.
Firstly and most obviously, that the crimes for which conviction is
sought reach a certain threshold, this being those crimes to which the
jurisdictional principle of universality attaches-genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. Secondly, we should require that
those who were victims of the atrocities support outside measures to
prosecute and punish. How to measure this support will remain an
intriguing question. Thirdly, the State in which the atrocities occurred must be seen to have no credible plans to prosecute and punish those responsible for the human rights abuses. Finally, prosecutions must stand a real chance of working-that is, of delivering
justice. These requirements, you will notice, are well within the one

28. See

2

THE
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WAR
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BEFORE THE

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 Nov. 1945-1 OCT. 1946,
at 153-54 (1947).
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currently under debate in relation to the Rome Statute and the establishment of the International Criminal Court.
The first and third of these indicators are easiest to assess. Only
those crimes to which the principle of universal jurisdiction applies
are liable to be prosecuted and punished. The principle flows from an
appreciation that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes
are offensive to all of humanity, and therefore of concern to all states
and not just the responsibility of the state in which they are committed.29 The principle was developed to ensure that perpetrators of the
most egregious crimes not escape justice. According to Grotius, our
guiding spirit tonight (to whom of course I had to get in at least one
reference or else fear that you might rescind your hospitality)Grotius wrote in 1625:
The fact must be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights
equal to those kings, have the right of demanding punishments not only
on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but
also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any person who30
soever.

A caveat must be added to this understanding of global responsibility: while the responsibility to address these crimes may be the responsibility of all of humankind, most importantly the responsibility
lies with the state in which the crimes are committed.
It is only when that state is unable or unwilling to prosecute and
punish that the responsibility becomes that of the international community-an understanding which is taken account of by the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court." Ascertaining that a
state is unwilling or unable to prosecute requires more than a cursory
examination of the situation. It requires a reading of all the factors
and dynamics particular to that society in which the atrocities took
place. Are there plans to institute such proceedings if none have, as
29. See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15-17 (2d
ed. 1999) (stating the basic tenets of human rights law).
30. See Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind tn Gentilli, Grotntit and
Su6rez, il WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 124 (Theodor Meron ed.. 1998).
31. See 1998 Rome Statute, supra note 17 (delineating the limits of the ICC's
jurisdiction).
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yet, been instituted? Has the society other arrangements in place for
addressing the crimes of the past? Has a transition taken place or is
one currently underway?
A related question, but so important it requires a category all of its
own, is whether victims themselves support outside measures to
prosecute and punish perpetrators of the past. In a context in which a
society has enacted arrangements to address the past, such as the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, consideration
must be given to the support the initiative received. It requires more
than that the process be a result of democratic decision-making, that
it receives the affirmation of a referendum or be enacted through the
processes of a democratically-elected legislature. There is always the
danger that those who were persecuted in the past are a minority
within the national population and that rule by the majority merely
entrenches their oppression. In South Africa, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act32 establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was passed by the first democratically
elected Parliament in which the African National Congress, a party
banned under apartheid, held the majority of seats. Nevertheless, dissent has been expressed, most notably, in the challenge before the
Constitutional Court of the TRC process brought by three families of
victims of apartheid.33 Dissent, however much in the minority, should
always be taken seriously particularly when it is expressed by victims against so traumatic a choice. But, the dissent of individuals
should not ultimately prevent new democracies from deciding democratically how they wish to deal with their respective shameful pasts.
Should the international community really have wished to dictate to
the Mandela administration in the immediate post-1994, how it
should deal with P.W. Botha or F.W. de Klerk?
Finally the most taxing question is whether prosecution and punishment will work-that is, will trials deliver justice? In most contexts, prosecution and punishment can and do provide a sense of justice being done-that justice being an acknowledgement in a public
32. See Reconciliation Act, supra note 5 (noting the Act's historic nature).
33. See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 1996 (2) SALR 43 (CC). See also Azanian Peoples
Org. (AZAPO) and Others v. Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Others,
1996 (4) SALR 562 (CC).
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space of the crime committed, punishment meted out in accordance
with the responsibility for the crime and some sort of compensation
awarded to the victim for the suffering inflicted.
But justice is not offered merely by the staging of formalistic
practices of prosecution and punishment. It is very much a context-based concept and this is nowhere more true than in relation to
transitional societies. Here, justice is both constructive of and foundational to the transition. What counts as justice, going forward, is
determined by the depth and scope and nature of the particular injustices in the particular society in the past. Justice in political transitions is always contextual: its meaning is conditioned and created by
the particular contours of the prior injustice suffered in the particular
country inquestion.'
Thus in South Africa, justice must necessarily include establishing
a basis for a nation-wide acknowledgement of the illegitimacy of
apartheid. It might seem too obvious to need emphasis that South Africa's past was illegitimate, yet given the thought-inhibiting impact
of the Cold War ideological divide, we still hear in South Africa the
idea that apartheid was bad, but its supposedly "terrorist" opponents
(meaning, such as yours truly) were worse.
In South Africa, justice must, in addition, include a decriminalization of the anti-apartheid resistance (Nelson Mandela, remember,
was an apartheid-era political convict), an acknowledgement of the
need for corrective action, a concept broader than your affirmative
action notion here in the United States, including affirmative action
but also aiming at broader goals of redistribution. We also need to
establish equality before the law in a country with no history of that.
And to place property rights on a legitimate footing, since apartheid
was certainly no Lockean property rights paradise, where ownership
followed merit or was the fruit of legitimate effort.
Thus in South Africa, as elsewhere, the requirements of transitional justice are drawn from the particular history that the society in
transit is leaving. This is evident even in the arguments made by
those who most vociferously advocate prosecution and punishment
as a uniform solution, regardless of context. Their most powerful argument is that trials draw a bright line between a past notorious for
34. See RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 6 (forthcoming 2001).
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state criminality and a future based on the rule of law; between old
injustice and new beginnings. Their point ultimately is that trials may
actually serve political ends, by re-establishing faith in the rule of
law. In demonstrating that no individual, however powerful, is immune from law's reach once democracy takes root. In this picture,
prosecutions and punishment are not seen as intrinsically expressive
of justice; rather, they are harbingers of justice. They demonstrate
something profound about the transition, about the new beginning.
Trials, according to this argument, represent a disavowal of the
predecessor regime's atrocious political ends, and so construct a new
legal order.
There are other contexts, conditioned by different experiences of
prior injustice, in which trials cannot play the role of distinguishing
the old from the new. In societies such as South Africa's, which have
experienced prolonged periods of authoritarian rule, involving massive violation of entire groups' rights, there has been a collective experience of abuse and victimization. Conversely, these periods of
abuse were supported and sustained in a systematic fashion by a
large portion of South Africa's white population. Our own brand of
transitional justice, therefore, required the treatment of inter-generational injustice. It required that individuals and groups who
were neither perpetrators nor victims in any uncomplicated sense had
to be involved in this process. If you never pulled a trigger nor held a
smoking gun, but yet you benefited from the societal system defended by the violence-if all you did was loaf around a poolside in
an opulent white apartheid suburb-you still needed to be involved
in the process. Trials could not do that.
In countries emerging from periods of authoritarian rule, in which
many of the abuses were committed in silence and secrecy, truth becomes paramount. In the construction of collective memory, of nation-building, the reality of an oppressive past gives content and direction. For individuals tormented by uncertainty, truth brings some
kind of peace. The South African amnesty process is one of individualized amnesty whereby perpetrators making full disclosures of
acts or omissions associated with a political objective are eligible to
receive amnesty. This incentive scheme-a give and take arrangement, useful for a society aimed at reconciliation-is the TRC's most
powerful means of delivering truth. Many of apartheid's perpetrators,
grasping at the possibility of amnesty in exchange for truth, broke
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ranks. And the fullness of these disclosures compelled other villains
of the apartheid era to come forward, lest they be prosecuted. So a
small pool of truth grew and grew, unlike what would have occurred
with the fragmentary and defensive narratives-"you have the right
to remain silent," as every TV watcher knows which trials and prosecutions tend to generate.
If international law is not to be beside the point for new democratic governments which have come to power not by absolute defeat
of past oppressors but by negotiated settlement, it must take account
of political constraints. In South Africa the ANC did not come to
power at gunpoint. In the negotiations, the National Party pushed
hard for the enactment of a blanket amnesty of the type it had periodically awarded its own officials and reminiscent of the Latin
American transitions during the 1980s. The ANC, if not quite faced
with Pinochet-style threats to its political longevity, was nevertheless
sensitive to the danger posed by opposition from within the security
forces-which Helen Suzman had called a 'creeping coup d'6tat by
consent'-should a policy of systematic prosecutions be pursued.
Moreover, there were limited resources available to prosecute and
punish, coupled with the danger that these limited resources, if directed at prosecutions and punishment, would be misspent, sabotaged
by those working within the judicial and policing spheres. Thus, in
the most important attempt at prosecution in the new South Africa,
the old apartheid general Magnus Malan and twenty-one others were
acquitted in 1996. As a recent human rights discussion document on
universal jurisdiction points out, "there is no point in encouraging
prosecution, whether abroad or at home, where there is a lack of reliable evidence to support the charge."3
You might say: "if the costs to the particular society of prosecution and punishment are prohibitive, why not allow the international
community to do so?" But there is in fact no easy and inexpensive
hand-over of responsibility because if the despots are put in the dock,
their supporters will not draw fine distinctions about the process
(whether domestic or international) by which this result is attained.
35. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARD CASES:
BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS TO JUSTICE ABROAD -

A GUIDE TO

UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (1999) (available at http://www.intemational-council.

org/publieationl .html).
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The consequences will impact on domestic politics-and domestic
stability-whatever the details of the prosecution process. Moreover,
the manner in which the new transitional regime engages with the
crimes of the past will be fundamental to its legitimacy and credibility. In establishing the South African TRC process we required all
sides of the struggle to apply for amnesty, allaying potential fears
that ours was a pursuit of victors' justice. Moreover, the tempering of
the force of law is and was, in our case, as much a demonstration of
where power lies in the new order as the infliction of law's power.
Usurping the transitional initiative from the domestic society would
undo much of the foundation-laying, critical for democracy.
There are other arguments often bracketed in the same categorythat TRC processes provide the space for victims to be heard and acknowledged, a space denied them under the oppressive regime and
within the courtroom; that the process allows for a meeting between
perpetrator and victim in a non-hostile environment enabling the reintegration of both perpetrator and victim into the community and the
restoration of relationships of social equality severed by the wrongdoing. These arguments are properly marshalled as a justification for
the decision to forego prosecution and punishment. They are arguments for the establishment of a TRC, not against prosecution and
punishment. A TRC process and the delivery of the ends highlighted
in these arguments might very easily run parallel to the more orthodox procedures of prosecution and punishment without either process
ever undermining the other. But, the specific context can never be
ignored.
Nevertheless, I hope that I have said enough to suggest that those
who advocate the prosecution of human rights abusers in all contexts
as an7absolute rule 6 mis-state the actual requirements of international
3

law.

36. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute thuman
Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2548-49 (1999) (advocating a general requirement of prosecution in an effort to eliminate the application
of political discretion). M. Cherif Bassiouni also advocates this position, and in
doing so scathingly criticizes any process that would allow political considerations
to prevent full-scale prosecutions:
[T]he practice of impunity has all too frequently been the result of realpolitik.
At times it is rationalized as a necessary evil, which is indispensable to
achieving peace. While this is true in some cases, in most cases it is a cynical
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CONCLUSION
The nature of the crimes committed, the domestic processes in
place to deal with past injustice, the support received for these processes by victims themselves and whether these processes have delivered justice-these are the factors any institution outside of the particular society would have to sort through before deciding to initiate
prosecutions. These considerations do not constitute a checklist but
are to be assessed qualitatively. Of course, where a State such as
Britain, which itself was the site of many of apartheid's crimes, decides to prosecute, it may validly do so without heeding any of the
dynamics specific to the South African arrangement. It would then,
however, be prosecuting on the basis of the jurisdictional principle of
territoriality-for its own sake and not because it seeks to stand in
the place of the violated State.
Deference should be accorded the domestic society's transitional
arrangements, on the basis, I would suggest, of the principle of national sovereignty. But not a principle of "national sovereignty"
premised on outdated notions that states are the only actors on the
international stage, but because the principle in recent times has been
reconfigured. Where states "are democratic, their sovereignty is also
an expression of their people's right to self-determination. "'"
The alternative is chaos in which the domestic prosecution
authorities of a country are able to do and undo democracy itself - to
make and unmake the fragile compromises on which the sunrise of
democracy often rests. Don't you shudder when I read the following:
"A Russian prosecutor announced yesterday that a criminal case had
been opened against Aslan Maskhadov, the democratically elected
Chechen leader, complicating any attempts to reach a negotiated set-

manipulation by governments of people's expectations that both peace and
justice can be attained.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, 5 (1996).
37. See Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International
Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 4, 41 (1996) (presenting an excellent recent article on the absoluteness or
otherwise of the duty to prosecute).
38. See Skidelsky & Ignatieff, supra note 15.
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tlement to the Chechen conflict."39 This is not an excerpt from some
awful fiction, but a recent report in the London Financial Times of
actual events. According to the article, "the move to brand Mr.
Maskhadov a terrorist was immediately criticized by a senior
' 4 Russian negotiator who helped bring an end to the 1994-96 war. )
In every democracy there will be factions, or legitimate differences of opinion on sensitive questions of foreign policy, including
international justice. Domestic prosecutorial authority, which tends
by its nature to be parochial, will be partial in its perspective. The
right to prosecute or to use force is only one arrow in liberty's
quiver. And it is not inherently and always on target-we must help
it along by other means.

39. John Thomhill, Chechen President Faces Criminal Prosecution, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at 5.
40. See id.

